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RECENT DECISIONS
CoNsTITUTioNAL LAW - DuE PROCESS - JuRISDICTION oF A STATE
TO TAX THE EXERCISE OF A PowER OF APPOINTMENT - Decedent's father,
a resident of Massachusetts, by his last will created a trust of the residue of his
estate, consisting of intangibles, and gave one share to decedent for life, with
remainder to whomsoever decedent should appoint by will. The trust was administered in Massachusetts and there was no question as to that state's power to
tax. Decedent, a resident of New York, appointed his share to his widow. The
New York courts held 1 that although the interest of the decedent fell within the
provisions of the New York tax law imposing a tax upon the transfer of the net
estate of resident decedents, the property passing under the power of appointment should not be taxed because the tax violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, according to Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton.2 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, that this interest
was within New York's taxing power. Graves v. Schmidlapp, (U. S. 1942)
62 S. Ct. 870 (1942).
The case marks a further limitation on the Fourteenth Amendment as a bar
to multiple taxation of intangibles and further elucidates the states' jurisdiction
to tax intangible property. 3 Before the thirties, the Court was of the opinion
that a state could tax intangible property if it imparted a benefit to either the
property or the owner in his enjoyment of it.4 Perhaps impressed with the inequality of the tax status of intangible property,compared with tangible property,5
the Court later attempted to prohibit multiple taxation of intangibles by restricting the taxing power to the state of the owner's domicile. 6 This development
1 1n re Thayer's Estate, 286 N. Y. 596, 35 N. E. (2d) 937 (1941), affirming
261 App. Div. 814, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 782 (1941), affirming 17z \'fisc. ~26, 15
N. Y. S. (2d) 208 (1940).
2 272 U.S. 567, 47 S. Ct. 202 (1927).
8 There seems to be little basis for distinguishing death from ad valorem property
taxes, although some distinction has been made. See Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S.
473, 45 S. Ct. 603 (1924).
4.New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U.S. 309, 20 S. Ct. 110 (1899) (applying the
business situs rule to hold that a state into which intangible wealth is brought for investment purposes may tax even though the owner is not a resident thereof) ; Blackstone
v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 S. Ct. 277 (1902) (a deposit in a New York trust company might be taxed at the death of its owner, even though the state of the domicile of
the owner, Illinois, also imposed a tax); Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 S. Ct.
4 73 ( 191 5) ( upholding the succession tax imposed by the state of decedent's domicile
on a revocable trust in another state, even though the latter state had imposed a tax) ;
Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1, 48 S. Ct. 410 (1928) (the state of decedent's
domicile could tax decedent's interest in stocks, mortgage bonds, and debentures of
foreign corporations, even though the evidences of these interests were held in another
state, and could also tax his interest in a partnership where the partnership assets were
in another state) .
5 The rule is that tangible property is taxable directly only in the state of its situs.
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 S. Ct. 36 (1905);
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603 (1924).
6 See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59 (1929)
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was ended with the decisions of Curry v. McCanless 1 and Graves v. Elliott. 8
In' the Cun:y case the decedent, a resident of Tennessee, had transferred securities in trust to an Alabama trust company retaining a life estate, a power to
revoke the trust, _and a power to appoint the remainder. Both Tennessee and
Alabama were held to have jurisdiction to impose death taxes. 9 The majority of
the Court in that case relied upon Bullen v. Wisconsin,1° which held that the
state of the settlor's domicile could impose an inheritance tax upon a trust of
intangibles established in another state where the settlor had resei;ved control
over the income and the power to revoke. The majority in the Curry case distinguished Wachovia Trust Co. v. Doughton,11 involving facts almost identical
to those of the principal case, on the grounds that in the Wachovia Trust Co.
case a granted power was held to be an insufficient basis for ·jurisdiction to tax,
while the Court was dealing with a reserved power in the Curry case.12 As was
( dictum that the domicile of beneficiaries of a trust of intangibles administered in
another state lacked jurisdiction to levy a property tax upon their equitable interests);
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 98 (1930) (Minnesota held to lack power to levy an inheritance tax upon obligations of that state and
its municipalities at death of a nonresident owner); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S.
586, 50 S. Ct. 436 (1930) (Missouri could not levy an inheritance tax upon bonds,
notes and funds deposited with a bank in that state by a nonresident owner); Beidler
v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U.S. 1, 51 St. Ct. 54 (1930) (state of incorporation could not levy an inheritance tax upon a debt of the corporation for a
loan advanced on an open account of its principal stockholder, a nonresident); First
National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 174 (1932) (state of incorporation could not levy an inheritance tax upon shares of the corporate stock owned
by a nonresident). See Brown, "The Present Status of Multiple Taxation of Intangible Property," 40 MICH. L. REv. 806 (1942), for arguments supporting the
view of the Court in this period.
1 307 U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900 (1939).
8 307 U. S. 383, 59 S. Ct. 913 (1939). See the comment on the two cases in 38
MICH. L. REv. 81 (1939).
9 .Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383, 59 S. Ct. 913 (1939), involved practically the
same facts except that New York and Colorado were involved.
·
10 240 U.S. 625, 36 S. Ct. 473 (1915).
11 272 U.S. 567, 47 S. Ct. 202 (1926). This case seems to proceed upon the
theory that since the appointee of the property takes title to the appointed property
from the donor· of the power and not from the donee, and since all problems relative
to the exercise of the power are to be settled by the law of the situs of the trust, the
state of the domicile of the donee added nothing and could not tax. See 2 5 MicH. L.
REV. 786 (1927). The Court in the principal case rejected the common-law theory
of powers for jurisdictional purposes by saying the power was property in the hands of
the donee and emphasized the protection given by the state of the domicile of the
donee to the exercise of this right of property. The Court left open the question of
the result if the power were not exercised.
12 On the distinction between a granted and a reserved power for purposes of
federal estate taxation, see l PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, § 9.03, pp.
416 et seq. (1942); Angell, "The Impact of the Law of Powers Upon our Internal
Revenue Laws," 39 MICH. L. REv. 1269 (1941).
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to be expected,18 the Court in the principal case rejected this dubious distinction
and specifically overruled the Wachovia case. The Court reiterated its holding
in the Curry case that the ~riterion of a state's jurisdiction to tax is whether it
has dominion over the persons in whom the intangible rights vest or whether the
state confers a benefit upon the holders of the intangible interest. The contention that this test should be changed if it enabled more than one taxing authority
to tax was flatly rejected.14
Charles J. O'Laughlin

18 See the comment in 38 M1cH. L. REV. 81 at 83 (1939), where the author
states, "The case [Wachovia Trust Co. v. Doughton] is virtually overruled by Curry
v. McCanless and Graves v. Elliott."
14 Of particular interest is the fact that Justice Roberts, the sole remaining justice
who ,dissented in the Curry and Elliott cases, concurred on the ground that he was
bound by the precedent established in the Curry case. See generally Dix, "Must We
Carry Our Stocks and Bonds in Our Pockets?" IS INo. L. J. 373 (1940).

